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Abstract—The qualities of Physical Unclonable Functions
(PUFs) suffer from several noticeable degradations due to silicon
aging. In this paper, we investigate the long-term effects of silicon
aging on PUFs derived from the start-up behavior of Static
Random Access Memories (SRAM). Previous research on SRAM
aging is based on transistor-level simulation or accelerated aging
test at high temperature and voltage to observe aging effects
within a short period of time. In contrast, we have run a long-
term continuous power-up test on 16 Arduino Leonardo boards
under nominal conditions for two years. In total, we collected
around 175 million measurements for reliability, uniqueness and
randomness evaluations. Analysis shows that the number of bits
that flip with respect to the reference increased by 19.3% while
min-entropy of SRAM PUF noise improves by 19.3% on average
after two years of aging. The impact of aging on reliability is
smaller under nominal conditions than was previously assessed
by the accelerated aging test. The test we conduct in this work
more closely resembles the conditions of a device in the field, and
therefore we more accurately evaluate how silicon aging affects
SRAM PUFs.
Index Terms—SRAM PUF, long-term, aging, evaluation, reli-
ability, uniqueness, randomness, entropy
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of Internet-connected devices worldwide is
expected to run in the tens of billions by 2030 [1]. One of
the key components in the security of an Internet-connected
device is a device-unique cryptographic identity that can be
verified by the cloud infrastructure. Existing methods for
securely storing such an identity in a large number of devices
often rely on keys stored in one-time programmable memory.
This method does not scale to billions of devices in the
Internet of Things (IoT). An alternative solution for secure
initiation of a cryptographic identity is based on Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUFs), which utilizes deep submicron
manufacturing process variation during the fabrication of the
device. PUFs technology based on Static Random Access
Memory (SRAM) has been commercially deployed in products
by Microsemi [2] and NXP [3]. SRAM PUF is applicable to
either generate reliable secure keys (reliability and uniqueness
requirement) or provide random entropy to the device (ran-
domness requirement) [4].
In commercial products, the lifetime of the device is a
significant concern. Deep into the physical level of a silicon
IC, some circuit’s parameters slowly and gradually change
over time, leading to the change of properties on the IC. This
change is defined as silicon aging. It has been presented that
silicon aging degrades the reliability of SRAM PUF [5] while
it improves noise entropy over time [6].
One of the methods to analyze silicon aging on SRAM PUF
is circuit simulation at transistor level. Another option is to
measure a silicon device at high temperature and operating
voltage which accelerates the aging effect. In this paper, for
the first time we propose to run the silicon device in nominal
condition for a sufficient amount of time to observe real-time,
non-simulated and non-accelerated aging effects.
A. Related Work
The concept of SRAM PUF was firstly proposed by Gua-
jardo et al. [7]. Kumar et al. studied the degradation of SRAM
cells for 70nm and 100nm CMOS technology by performing
transistor level simulation [8]. Aging of other technologies
including Partially Depleted Silicon On Insulator (PDSOI) [9]
and FinFET [10] are also investigated based on simulation.
On the other hand, Maes et al. used accelerated aging on
the silicon to demonstrate SRAM PUF reliability degrades for
65nm CMOS technology [5], [11].
B. Our Contribution
This paper presents the first experimental aging test of
SRAM PUF under nominal condition continuously running for
two years. The nominal aging test reflects the practical aging
effect on a device in the field more accurately, since we do not
expect constant stress conditions during the device’s lifetime.
Long-term continuous aging assessment of the SRAM PUF
with respect to reliability, uniqueness and randomness has been
conducted. For the assessment we used SRAMs of low cost
generic use Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices.
The evaluation indicates that even after years of continuous
use, SRAM PUF remains of sufficient quality for reliable and
secure key generation scheme and random number generation.
The reliability property is worsened to some extent. The
impact, however, is less pessimistic than the equivalent aging
effect derived from accelerated aging.
C. Paper Outline
Section II provides the background of SRAM PUF technol-
ogy, in particular the silicon aging effect on SRAM PUF cells.
Section III describes the measurement setup of our long-term
aging experiment. Section IV presents the evaluation result
and discussion on the aging data from the measurement, and
the paper is finally concluded in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SRAM PUF technology and applications
The basic 6T-SRAM cell structure consisting of two cross-
coupled inverters and access transistors (not shown) is shown
in Fig. 1. The initial state Q after a new power-up is de-
termined by uncontrollable variations during manufacturing.
The preferred power-up state is persistent and stable after
manufacturing. On the other hand, a small quantity of SRAM
cells are unstable and show a random preference at every
power-up. Taking both stable and unstable SRAM cells into
consideration, previous research has shown that the power-up
pattern of SRAM memory is perfectly reproducible (with the
proper application of error-correction codes), unique [11] and
also capable of providing randomness [12]. Therefore, SRAM
PUF can be applied in the following scenarios.
1) Secure Key generation: The most common application
of PUFs is secure key generation and storage. The crypto-
graphic key is derived based on SRAM PUF and stored via
helper data scheme. In this application, reliability and security
are important properties for SRAM PUFs.
Reliability means the response of SRAM PUFs is repro-
duciable with limited amount of bit error rate in predefined
environmental and system conditions. Error correction codes
can be designed to correct up to 25% of bit error rate without
reproduction failure [13].
On the other hand, security means two properties. First,
SRAM PUF should have sufficient entropy to prevent signifi-
cant information leakage on the generated key. It implies that
bias present on SRAM PUFs should be within the boundary.
Current debiasing schemes can deal with 25% / 75% bias [14].
Second, the response of an SRAM PUF is unpredictable even
given all the responses of other SRAM PUFs. It implies that
SRAM PUF should have good uniqueness.
2) True Random Number Generation: True Random Num-
ber Generator (TRNG) provides an unpredicted seed to crypto-
graphic systems. Electrical noise influences the initial state of
unstable SRAM cells. By utilizing these noises in the circuits,
SRAM PUFs can also serve as TRNG. In this application, a
sufficient amount of bits should flip over multiple power-ups
in order that SRAM PUFs can provide sufficient randomness
at next power-up test.
B. Aging Effect on SRAM Cells
During nominal operations, a digital CMOS circuit in a
silicon chip degrades over time. The dominant aging effect
is Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI) resulting in
a temporal increase in the threshold voltage, particularly for
a switched-on PMOS transistor [5]. For simplicity, all the
following parameters related to PMOS are treated as positive
values. In Fig. 1, when an SRAM cell stores state zero
(Q = 0), P1 is switched off and P2 is switched on. As
a result of NBTI, Vth,P2 will increase while Vth,P1 is not
affected. Also, the fact that P2 is switched on indicates that
initially Vth,P2 < Vth,P1. Therefore, the temporal tendency of
this SRAM cell is that |Vth,P2 − Vth,P1| grows smaller. This
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Fig. 1: Two cross-coupled inverters at the core of each SRAM
cell (Other two access transistors not shown).
tendency also holds when (Q = 1). Smaller |Vth,P2 − Vth,P1|
means the SRAM cell is more balanced and more likely to
have PUF response bits flip. From the reliability perspective,
this effect deteriorates SRAM PUF as key generation scheme
since more SRAM cells tend to lose stability and randomly
flip, i.e. the reliability of SRAM PUF worsens over time.
From the randomness perspective, more SRAM cells become
balanced and unpredictable over measurements, i.e. more
randomness can be harvested based on SRAM PUFs.
Additionally, with the introduction of high-permittivity gate
dielectrics, Positive Bias Temperature Instability (PBTI) for
a switched-on NMOS transistor is also becoming more sig-
nificant [9]. Due to this effect, then NMOS transistor oper-
ating with a positive gate-to-source voltage experiences time-
dependent threshold voltage increase.
Other silicon aging mechanisms including hot electron
injection, gate dielectric breakdown and electromigration are
discussed in [15].
III. MEASUREMENT SETUP
The measurement platform was set up for the continuous
SRAM PUF observation read-out at room temperature. SRAM
chips were getting successive power cycles from Feb. 8, 2017
to Feb. 8, 2019. Each SRAM chip has been powered up and
read out approximately 11 million times within this period, i.e.
around 10 measurements per minute. For the more exhaustive
evaluation, 16 devices were tested in the measurement setup,
leading to around 175 million measurements in total.
The type of the SRAM chips used in the setup is the SRAM
on an ATmega32u4 microcontroller on an Arduino Leonardo
board. The operating voltage of ATmega32u4 is 5V, and the
size of the SRAM is 2.5 KByte.
As shown in Fig. 2, the whole measurement setup consists
of the following components: 1) An external power supply
that provides power to the setup system; 2) 2 Arduino boards
as master boards. The two master boards are denoted as M0
and M1 respectively in Fig. 2a. Each master board controls its
slave boards via I2C protocol and communicates with other
components in the system; 3) 16 Arduino as slave boards.
The slave board reads out its SRAM power-up data and sends
them back to its master board; 4) A power switch board
that provides power to all the slave boards according to the
command of each master board. Separate connections between
(a) Schematic of SRAM PUF on Arduino
boards measurement setup and flow of
power/data signals.
(b) Practical measurement setup including 18
Arduino boards stacked up in two layers and
power switch circuits.
Fig. 2: Measurement setup for the long-term test.
the power switch and each slave board avoid interference
between boards in the same stack; 5) Raspberry Pi receives
SRAM data from master boards, and sends them to a database
and stores them in a JSON format.
In Fig. 2a, all the 18 Arduino boards were stacked up in
two layers. The top layer consisting of M1 and from S16 to
S23 is visible in Fig. 2b. Two layers communicate with each
other via connection between M0 and M1 so that data from
different layers are synchronized, i.e. each slave board always
produces the same quantity of SRAM PUF data within a fixed
period of time. The layer at bottom is denoted as layer 0, and
the layer at the top is denoted as layer 1. The detailed test
flow of layer 0 as an example is described in Algorithm 1.
We used Tektronix TDS 3034B oscilloscope to observe the
power cycle curve of four slave boards, namely S3, S4 from
layer 0, and S19, S20 from layer 1. S3 and S19, S4 and
S20 are in the same stack, respectively. As shown in Fig. 3,
the period of one power cycle is 5.4s. The power-on time
of each board is 3.8s and the power-off time is 1.6s. Boards
on the same layer (e.g. S19 and S20) are powered on and
off at the same time. The power curves between two layers
are unsynchronized to avoid interference, and to increase the
Fig. 3: Waveforms of power curves of board S3, S4, S19, S20
observed from the oscilloscope.
Algorithm 1 Test flow on layer 0
1) M0 waits the end signal from M1, meaning layer 0 starts
its test flow after layer 1 finalizes its last test cycle.
2) M0 enables the power of its slave boards S0 to S7, via
power switch
3) When all the slaves on layer 0 are switched on, M0 gives
the signal to M1, enabling layer 1 to starts its new test
flow
4) Each slave board reads the first 1 KByte of its SRAM
power-up pattern, and sends the data back to M0 via I2C
protocol
5) M0 receives data from slave boards and sends the data
to Raspberry pi
6) M0 disables the power of slave boards S0 to S7
7) M0 waits the start signal from M1, meaning layer 0
finalizes its cycle when autonomous read-out starts in
layer 1.
8) M0 gives the signal to M1, indicating that layer 0 finalizes
its test cycle.
throughput of measurements.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Initial SRAM PUF quality evaluation
To visualize the distribution of the initial SRAM PUF, the
first SRAM power-up pattern of board S0 is plotted in Fig.
4. For evaluating the initial SRAM PUF quality, we select
the first 1,000 read-out data of each board measured on Feb.
8, 2017 (starting date of the test). Three important metrics
are adopted for the evaluation, as described in the following
paragraphs.
1) Within-Class Hamming Distance: As described in Sec-
tion II-A, the difference between a reference pattern and
another measured pattern of the same SRAM chip is sup-
posed to be limited. To evaluate the reliability of SRAM
PUF, the first read-out pattern is used as the reference. The
other measurements of the same chip are compared to this
Fig. 4: Visualized startup pattern of 1KB memory on Arduino
board with ID = 0.
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Fig. 5: Fractional Hamming distance / Hamming weight distri-
butions at the beginning of the test (all the 16 Arduino boards
included).
reference using fractional Hamming Distance (FHD)1. The
FHD assessment within the same SRAM chip is defined as
Within-Class Hamming Distance (WCHD). It is observed in
Fig. 5 that WCHD remains below 3%. This value is well
within the boundary, as specified in Section II-A for error
correction. So WCHD results show good reliability.
2) Between-Class Hamming Distance: The SRAM PUF
response of a chip should be unpredictable, even given the
responses of other chips. The FHD between reference of every
two different chips is defined as Between-Class Hamming
Distance (BCHD). The BCHD is supposed to be significantly
larger than WCHD and ideally close to 50% so that the PUF
of a certain chip is distinguishable from others. As shown in
Fig. 5, the BCHD is distributed between 40% and 50%. The
BCHD significantly deviates from the WCHD, showing good
uniqueness among devices.
3) Fractional Hamming Weight: Hamming Weight (HW) is
the number of non-zero bits in the PUF response. In case of
Fractional Hamming Weight (FHW), the HW is divided by the
length of the string. As shown in Fig. 5, the FHW of different
SRAM chips lies between 60% and 70%. This indicates that
the SRAM PUF is not perfectly unbiased, but still capable of
generating a key of sufficient security strength [14].
1Hamming Distance (HD) is defined as the number of bits that different
between two bit strings. In case of fractional Hamming Distance (FHD), the
HD is divided by the length of the string.
B. Reliability and Uniqueness Evaluation
We select the first 1,000 consecutive measurements after
midnight on the 8th of each month for each SRAM chip. These
SRAM PUF data are used for evaluating the effect of aging
on reliability and uniqueness. The method for the evaluation
is presented below.
1) WCHD: We select the first read-out pattern of each
board on the starting date as the reference. Measurements
derived in the following months are compared to this reference.
2) BCHD: For each month, the first SRAM read-out data
of the 1,000 consecutive measurements mentioned above is
used to calculate BCHD.
3) FHW: For each month, we use the 1,000 consecutive
measurements to calculate FHW.
4) PUF entropy: In addition to the metrics mentioned
above, PUF entropy is introduced to assess the uniqueness
of SRAM PUFs using min-entropy [16]. If a binary source
has probability p0 and p1 to produce ‘0’ and ‘1’ respectively,
then the definition for min-entropy of this binary source is:
Hmin,PUF = − log2 (max (p0, p1)).
Assuming all bits from the SRAM PUF are independent [17],
each bit location can be regarded as an individual binary
source. Thus the average min-entropy of SRAM PUFs over
n bits is:
(Hmin,PUF )average =
1
n
n∑
i=1
− log2 (max (pi 0, pi 1)) .
For the calculation, the SRAM PUF data for BCHD computa-
tion is used to derive PUF entropy, i.e. p0 and p1 are computed
as probabilities over all measured SRAMs.
C. Randomness Evaluation
Apart from what are important if SRAM PUFs are applied
for key generation, randomness is evaluated to assess the
feasibility of using SRAM PUFs as a random source [12].
Two randomness-related properties are presented below.
1) Stable cells: Both process variation and electrical noise
impact the skewness of SRAM cells [4]. An SRAM cell which
is always powered up to state 0 or 1 over a large number of
power-ups is considered as a stable cell. More quantitatively,
one-probability is introduced to assess the stability of SRAM
cells. One-probability (pi) of a cell i at a certain SRAM is the
probability that the response value of this cell (Ri) is ‘1’ over
multiple power-ups [18], defined as:
pi := Pr(Ri = 1)
In practice, the cell with one-probability of zero or one over
1,000 consecutive measurements in a certain month is counted
as a stable cell in that particular month.
2) Noise entropy: Noise entropy measures the unpre-
dictability of next SRAM power-up response given the in-
formation of prior responses. A balanced cell is sensitive to
noise and thus contributes to noise entropy of SRAM PUF
based TRNG. Similar to PUF entropy, min-entropy is applied
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Fig. 6: Development of reliability and uniqueness qualities of SRAM PUFs and randomness of SRAM PUF based TRNG on
all the 16 Arduino boards during the long-term aging test. The aging period started from Feb. 2017 and ended in Feb. 2019.
The test condition is at room temperature. Different lines in (a), (b) and (c) mean qualities of different SRAMs.
to estimate entropy of noise on SRAM PUF over multiple
power-ups [12]. Using 1,000 consecutive measurement data,
the average min-entropy of noise on SRAM PUF over n bits
based on the one-probability of each bit is
(Hmin,noise)average =
1
n
n∑
i=1
− log2 (max (pi, 1− pi)) .
Note that Hmin,noise is noise entropy calculated based
on multiple measurements of single SRAM, evaluating the
randomness of TRNG based on SRAM PUFs. Hmin,PUF is
PUF entropy calculated based single measurement of multiple
SRAMs, evaluating the uniqueness of SRAM PUFs.
D. Result discussion
The experimental aging results after 2-year of continuous
test is summarized in Table I. Both the average value (AVG.)
and worst-case value (WC.) among 16 devices are presented
in the table. The development of core properties over time
is plotted in Fig. 6. The evaluation result of aging effect on
SRAM PUF is discussed in two aspects.
1) SRAM PUF as key generation scheme: Within the time
frame of 2-year aging, the FHD with respect to the initial
reference at the start of the test is averagely increased from
2.49% to 2.97%, or in other words, the average number of
bit errors with respect to the initial measurement increases by
about 0.74% each month over a 2-year period, indicated in Fig.
6a. The increase of WCHD is in line with NBTI aging effect
on SRAM. Therefore, the reliability of SRAM PUF worsens
within a limited boundary due to aging effect. In contrast to
accelerated aging showing WCHD increases from 5.3% to
7.2%, which is about 1.28% monthly change over the first
2 years [5], the reliability suffers less reduction. This means
the previous research based on accelerated aging overestimated
the degradation of SRAM PUF reliability.
Over the aging period, the HW of each SRAM remains
almost constant, leading to a negligible change in BCHD and
PUF entropy. Thus, the uniqueness of SRAM PUF is not
impacted by aging effects. The results are indicated in Fig.
6b and Fig. 6d.
2) SRAM PUF as true random number generation: The
ratio of stable cells decreases from 85.9% to 83.7% on average
among devices, with a 0.11% decrease monthly. This result is
also consistent with the hypothesis of NBTI aging effect in
Section II-B.
As a consequence of fewer stable SRAM cells, the noise
entropy is increased from 3.05% to 3.64%, with a 0.74%
TABLE I: EVALUATION RESULT OF SRAM PUF QUALITIES
AT THE START AND THE END OF THE TEST
Evaluation Start End
Relative
Change
Monthly
Change
WCHD
AVG. 2.49% 2.97% +19.3% +0.74%
WC. 2.72% 3.25% +19.5% +0.74%
HW
AVG. 62.70% 62.70% negligiblea negligible
WC. 65.78% 65.62% -0.24% -0.01%
Ratio of
Stable Cells
AVG. 85.9% 83.7% -2.49% -0.11%
WC. 87.2% 85.4% -2.22% -0.87%
Noise entropy
AVG. 3.05% 3.64% +19.3% +0.74%
WC. 2.73% 3.29% +20.5% +0.78%
BCHD
AVG. 46.79% 46.80% negligible negligible
WC. 44.31% 44.67% +0.81% 0.03%
PUF entropy 64.92% 64.91% negligible negligible
aNegligible means change is less than 0.01%.
increase rate per month. Therefore, the randomness of SRAM
PUF based TRNG is improved after aging. The result is
indicated in Fig. 6c.
Another notable result is that the monthly change rate in
WCHD and noise entropy is larger at the start of the test than
after 1 year. This can be explained as follows: We define stable
cells as fully-skewed cells, and unstable cells with preference
on power-up pattern as partially-skewed cells. For instance, in
Fig. 1, assume that initially the SRAM cell is fully skewed
at state zero, i.e. Vth,P2 < Vth,P1 (all the values are treated
as positive). At the start, the power-up state is always zero,
leading to smaller |Vth,P2−Vth,P1|, which gradually converts
this cell to a partially-skewed cell. This indicates that after a
certain period of aging, the stable cell becomes unstable, and
sometimes the new power-up state Q = 1, leading to larger
|Vth,P2−Vth,P1|. As a result, the tendency of |Vth,P2−Vth,P1|
is not monotonic over the aging.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented the result of silicon aging on
SRAM as PUF and as source of TRNG based on long-term
test in nominal conditions. Based on the experimental result
derived from 2-year measurement, the evaluation confirms
the anticipated NBTI effect on SRAM cells. The uniqueness
keeps almost constant during the aging period. The reliability
of SRAM PUF gradually degrades, the extent of which, is
less pessimistic than the emulated result from accelerated
aging test. WCHD increases by 0.74% each month in nominal
conditions, while WCHD increases by 1.28% each month
in accelerated aging. Meanwhile, the aging effect slightly
improves the randomness of SRAM PUF based TRNG. Noise
entropy improved by 0.74% each month.
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